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“Judge Reid is best avoided on a Monday following a weekend in which the USC football team loses.”1
1 Introduction
David Hume once argued that moral reasoning is “slave to the passions” (Hume 1978). Jurist Jerome Frank proposed that
“uniquely individual factors often are more important causes of judgments than anything which could be described as political,
economic, or moral [views]” (Hutcheson, Jr. 1929; Frank 1930 [2009])), a perspective often caricatured as “what the judge
had for breakfast” (Schauer 2009). Recent work in cognitive science provides strong evidence for a link between emotion
and moral judgment (Prinz 2007). Moving beyond judgment, this article examines the decisions of judges. We study the link
between judicial decisions and emotional cues associated with wins and losses by professional football teams and with the
weather, using the universe of U.S. asylum decisions and U.S. district court sentencing decisions. Behavioral anomalies in
these high-stakes settings highlight their fragility and the promise of AI to improve efficiency and fairness through personalized
nudges of judges. Psychologists have documented many effects of moderate size in the lab, so “settings where people are closer
to indifference among options are more likely to lead to detectable effects [of behavioral biases] outside of it” (Simonsohn
2011). As the preferences over the legally relevant factors wanes, the influence of extraneous factors grows. Then to measure
behavioral biases of judges is to document their revealed preference indifference, which raises the spectre of difference in
indifference, i.e., privilege disparities when prominent legal actors are indifferent to certain societal groups.
What determines judicial decisions? We would like to believe it is “the law”. To be sure, the law may be hard to determine
or even indeterminate. The identity of the judge can thus make a large difference. This simple fact was statistically established
at least a century ago (Everson [1919]) and triggered policy responses such as the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines. In
particular, judicial decisions differ by judicial ideology, as surveyed in later studies (Fischman and Law [2009]) and recognized
in the frequent judicial confirmation battles. But while these inter-judge differences show that the meaning of “the law” is not
unique in practice, they are consistent with each judge consistently applying his or her version of the law. Indeed, normative
theory readily admits such variation because the correct interpretation of the law is not unique or at least not discernible for
real world judges (Dworkin [1986], Kennedy [1998]).
In this article, we provide evidence from a natural experiment for a different kind of variation. We detect intra-judge
variation driven by factors completely unrelated to the merits of the case, or to any case characteristics whatsoever. Concretely,
we show that asylum grant rates in U.S. immigration courts differ by the success of the court city’s NFL team on the night
before, and by the city’s weather on the day of the decision. Our data include 1.5 million decisions spanning three decades –
22,000 asylum decisions on Mondays after a game; a half million asylum decisions in total; and a million sentencing decisions
– and allows exclusion of confounding factors, such as scheduling and seasonal effects. Most importantly, the design holds
the identity of the judge constant. On average, U.S. immigration judges grant an additional 1.4% of the asylum petitions–and
U.S. district judges assign 0.6% fewer prison sentences and 5% longer probation sentences (a substitute for imprisonment)—
1Kathy Morris Wolf, California Courts and Judges (1996) p. 1020 (http://bit.ly/1k7goag, visited 3/29/2014).
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on the day after their city’s NFL team won, relative to days after the team lost. Bad weather on the day of the decision has
approximately the opposite effect. By way of comparison, the average grant rate is 39%, the average imprisonment rate is
88%, and the average probation length is 40 days. Effects are larger with upset losses (defeats when the team was predicted
to win by four or more points), but not upset wins (victories when the team was predicted to lose), consistent with asymmetry
in the gain-loss utility function.
Further, the available data allow us to determine if sports outcomes and weather influence the judge directly or indirectly
through lawyer behavior—we find that the effect of NFL outcomes on asylum decisions is entirely borne by unrepresented
applicants. In this sample, there is no lawyer, and these applicants bear the brunt of judicial indifference. Moreover, we
suspect that refugees are not avid fans of NFL games to be affected by their outcomes. In U.S. federal district courts, sentencing
decisions are almost always made after a guilty plea, without a trial. Taken together, our results demonstrate that case outcomes
depend on more than “the law,” “the facts” of the case, judicial ideologies, or even constant judicial biases, for example with
respect to race. While we suspect that many practitioners would not be surprised by that basic claim, the contribution of this
article, however, is to provide clear causal identification of two such factors, and to measure their magnitude. The measured
effects of 1.4%, 0.6%, and 5% appear large for two reasons. First, we can only measure one emotional influence out of many.
Presumably, other factors such as family problems or joys, traffic jams, or health fluctuations have an even greater influence on
a judge’s state of mind and thus plausibly case outcomes. If we had data on these, we would expect to find much larger effects.
Second, even the estimate of NFL effects is only a lower bound, for lack of better data on the diverging preferences of the
judges only partly addressed by our using the birth state of the district court judges. We find that the effect of NFL outcomes
on sentencing decisions is more salient for those judges born in the same state as the football team, which points towards a
more direct effect on the judge rather than an indirect effect. If we had the true preferences of judges, the coefficients may be
even larger.
Numerous field studies that have shown humans in many settings to be influenced by seemingly irrelevant factors in
general and by sports outcomes and weather in particular. For example, sports results affect stock returns (Edmans et al.
[2007]), sports results influence voting in political elections (Healy et al. [2010]), and disappointing NFL football results
trigger domestic violence (Card and Dahl [2011]). Many similar studies exist for weather, and the research on weather’s effect
on economics and finance has been summarized and experimentally traced to weather’s effects on risk attitudes (Bassi et al.
[2013]). Moreover, bad weather on visiting days increases the chance that an admitted student will enroll (Simonsohn [2010]).
Such effects are manifestations of the broader point that weather strongly influences mood (Connolly [2013]).
One article detects time-of-day patterns in Israeli judges’ parole decisions (Danziger et al. [2011b]). Concretely, the
article shows that parole approval rates drop with the time from the judges’ last meal. One potential problem with this
research design is that the order of prisoners’ appearance before the judges and the exact time judges choose to take breaks
may not be random (Weinshall-Margel and Shapard [2011], Danziger et al. [2011a]). The sample size (N = 1, 112 and 8
judges) is also several orders of magnitude smaller than ours. There are also various papers showing clear judicial biases in
the laboratory environment (e.g., Guthrie et al. [2000], Guthrie et al. [2007]; Rachlinski et al. [2009], Rachlinski et al. [2013];
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cf. Simon [2012]). In particular, these experiments clearly identify racial bias (e.g., Rachlinski et al. [2009]). Outside the lab,
findings of racial bias are always subject to at least the theoretical possibility that different outcomes reflect unobserved case
heterogeneity beyond race.
Massive inter-judge variation in asylum grants has been documented by Ramji-Nogales et al. [2007], who introduced the
legal literature to the asylum data. They showed that grant rates for the same applicant nationality in the same city could
be anywhere between, e.g., 0 and 68% depending on the judge who heard the case. Our findings complement theirs. Their
findings, while shocking, would be consistent with individual judges steadily applying the same legal philosophy – their own
–, but legal philosophy differing across judges. By contrast, our finding shows that consistency is limited even within judge.
Asylum courts involve serious, potentially life-or-death decisions (Ramji-Nogales et al. [2007]). Their case load is very
high, forcing immigration judges to make important decisions with little time (on average 7 minutes by one estimate2) and
hence presumably with less deliberation and more of a “hunch” than other judges (Hutcheson, Jr. [1929]). The Board of
Immigration Appeals provides little guidance on the application of the broad standard for asylum petitions, namely “reasonable
fear of persecution.” This lack of time for deliberation coupled with a very open-ended decision standard may amplify
emotional influences. For replication purposes, we consider criminal sentencing by federal district judges in 1971–2012
(primarily 1998–2011), the only other large data base of comparable judicial decisions that we are aware of. Like the asylum
data, sentencing cases are numerous and relatively homogeneous, and the outcomes are easy to classify. With hundreds or
even thousands of similar cases per judge, we can thus construct fairly precise baseline approval or sentencing rates for each
judge from the judge’s own decision record. While we may like to believe that sentencing by federal district judges is not
susceptible to influence by extraneous factors (due to higher quality of the federal judges, more time for deliberation, or the
constraining effects of federal sentencing guidelines), in fact, district judges are susceptible to the same influences as asylum
judges.
Furthermore, an article finds that outcomes of games played by Louisiana State University football team affects judicial
decisions handed down by judges in a Louisiana juvenile court (Eren and Mocan [2018]).3 The article finds that unexpected
losses increase sentence length on juvenile defendants imposed by the judges by around 6.4 percent. Like their analysis finding
larger effects for judges who attended Louisiana State University, we find larger effects for judges who grew up in the area
of the football team. One difference between their setting and ours is their sample size of 9,346 defendants and 207 judges is
smaller than the 1.5 million decisions and 1,684 judges analyzed in this article. A second difference is that judges in Louisiana
juvenile courts may be somewhat less professional than judges appointed by the U.S. President and confirmed by the Senate,
which may amplify emotional influences.4 A subsequent work that replicates our weather results finds that asylum denial rates
2Eli Saslow, “In a crowded immigration court, seven minutes to decide a family’s future,” The Washington Post, 2/2/2014.
3Our article, first submitted in January 2014 and presented in May 2014 American Law and Economics Association (and a few universities before then)
is antecedent to theirs.
4Another difference is probation length, which is authorized by U.S. law as an alternative for imprisonment and viewed as an act of grace, delaying the
imposition or execution of a sentence. However, in Eren and Mocan [2018]’s setting, probation is a measure of severity. In the federal courts, it is not so
clear. In general, probation can be interpreted as the judge viewing the criminal record of the defendant as not sufficient for imprisonment of a certain length,
or as a form of rehabilitation. Historically, a defendant could be assigned a sentence and be placed on probation, with his or her sentence suspended. In Davis
v. Parker, 293 F Supp 1388 (DC Del 1968), probation was “an act of grace”. In United States v. Allen, 349 F Supp 749 (ND Cal 1972), the court ruled that
“Probation’s primary objective is to protect society by rehabilitating the offender”.
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monotonically increase with temperature (Heyes and Saberian [2018]).5 Our complementary analysis also finds temperature
effects for sentencing decisions. Their article attributes the channel to the judge (rather than the lawyer or defendant) because
of the differences by gender of judge.6 We also complement their evidence with a less ambiguous measure of bad weather
(rain, winds, snow), and we find non-monotonic mood effects with temperature (possibly due to our larger sample). Baylis
[2018] documents a clear U-shape between temperature and sentiment measured in twitter. We also complement these articles
by using machine learning to estimate causal importance scores.
Unlike these other articles, our findings suggest a policy in that courts could impose a requirement that respondents are due
free access to counsel in asylum cases. The positive effects of lawyers on outcomes for respondents in observational studies
are large, and we present evidence for one kind of mechanism (reducing “indifference”) that the presence of a lawyer helps
sharpen judicial analysis, removing arbitrary things from the outcomes, undercutting the negative effects of mood swings (e.g.,
upset losses).
2 Data
The first empirical setting is U.S. asylum court decisions and the second is U.S. federal district court decisions.
2.1 Asylum Judges: Data Description and Institutional Context
The United States offers asylum to foreign nationals who can prove that (1) they have a well-founded fear of persecution in
their own countries, and (2) their race, religion, nationality, political opinions, or membership in a particular social group is
one central reason for the threatened persecution. Decisions to grant or deny asylum are potentially very high stakes for the
asylum applicants. An applicant for asylum may reasonably fear imprisonment, torture, or death if forced to return to her
home country (see Ramji-Nogales et al. [2007] for a more detailed description of the asylum adjudication process in the U.S.).
This article uses administrative data from 1993 to 2013 on U.S. refugee asylum cases considered in immigration courts.
Judges hear two types of cases: affirmative cases (where the applicant seeks asylum on her own initiative) and defensive cases
(where the applicant applies for asylum after being apprehended by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)). Defensive
cases are referred directly to the immigration courts while affirmative cases pass a first round of review by asylum officers in
the lower level Asylum Offices. See Appendix A for more details regarding the asylum application process and defensive vs.
affirmative applications.
The court proceeding at the immigration court level is adversarial and typically lasts several hours. Asylum seekers may
be represented by an attorney at their own expense. A DHS attorney cross-examines the asylum applicant and argues before
the judge that asylum is not warranted. Those that are denied asylum are ordered deported, although in some cases applicants
may further appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
5Heyes and Saberian [2018] use data from “a website run by an international consortium of agencies that helps asylum seekers in Australia, Canada, the
United States and several countries in Europe.” This data source reports a far lower average grant rate of 16%.
6A potential alternative explanation could be that male judges are less affected by the different behaviors that lawyers and applicants exhibit on hot days.
High temperature increases apathy and lowers effort (Cao and Wei [2005], Wyndham [2013]).
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Judges have a high degree of discretion in deciding case outcomes. They are subject to the supervision of the Attorney
General, but otherwise exercise independent judgment and discretion in considering and determining the cases before them.
This discretion is evidenced by the wide disparities in grant rates among judges associated with the same immigration court.
Judges are appointed by the Attorney General and typically serve until retirement. Their base salaries are set by a federal
pay scale and locality pay is capped at Level III of the Executive Schedule. In 2014, that rate was $167,000. Based upon
conversations with the President of the National Association of Immigration Judges, no bonuses are granted.
We obtained the data directly from EOIR via a FOIA request (we also obtained a nearly identical data set via Transactional
Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) and double-checked our results on those data). The data contains information on hear-
ing dates, the completion date, whether the applicant was legally represented, whether the application was filed affirmatively
or defensively (i.e., in defense of a removal proceeding), and the applicant’s origin. We exclude non-asylum related immi-
gration decisions and focus on applications for asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the convention against
torture (CAT). Applicants typically apply for all three types of asylum protection at the same time. As in Ramji-Nogales et al.
[2007], when an individual has multiple decisions on the same day on these three applications, we use the decision on the
asylum application because a grant of asylum allows the applicant all the benefits of a grant of withholding of removal or
protection under the withholding-convention against torture while the reverse does not hold. The two categories are almost
always ancillary to the asylum application, in which case they are not independent data points. There are only 22,000 inde-
pendent withholding of removal and protection under the convention against torture applications, far fewer than the 434,000
asylum applications. We keep withholding of removal and protection under the convention against torture applications while
only marginally increasing sample size, but only keep those that constituted independent applications.7
The main merit hearing is the hearing at which the case’s substance is tried. Several practitioners have said that the judge
will almost inevitably announce the final decision at the conclusion of the hearing. This is thus the relevant date for our
purposes. However, the data does not explicitly flag the main merit hearing date. If the judge renders an oral decision at the
hearing’s conclusion, the main merit hearing date will coincide with the case completion date, which is in the data. We use
the completion date, and drop from the data all cases for which the completion date does not coincide with a hearing date.8 At
this point, our data slims to 424,065 observations from the initial 456,686. For analyzing the impact of NFL games, 26,910
of the observations occur after a game and 88,456 are on Monday. The intersection of these data restrictions yields 22,294
observations. Over 89% of the decisions after an NFL game fall on Monday as opposed to the other days, so we restrict our
baseline analysis to Mondays for the NFL analysis.9 We later use all the Mondays to see if the wins increase grant rates or the
7We keep applications with a unique idncase idnproceeding.
8Sometimes, however, the judge reserves a written decision. In that case, the official completion date and the main hearing date do not coincide. Consistent
with this, we find that this latter group of cases is more likely to involve a lawyer (94% vs. 90%), more likely to be a defensive case (46% vs. 38%), and—
perhaps because the proportion of defensive cases is higher—less likely to result in a grant (36% vs. 39%). This introduces the theoretical possibility that
the effects we observe are not true effects on the ultimate decision, but rather case composition effects as judges are more or less prone to reserve a written
decision after a game was won. We have two replies to this. Firstly, the basic point would still go through: extraneous factors influence judicial decisions,
even if the decision is procedural rather than substantive. Second, the number of decisions per day given our sample restriction is not systematically greater
or smaller after wins. For the same reasons, and because they are reportedly very rare anyway, we are not worried that a greater or lesser rate of continuances
after wins biases our results.
9The sample of Monday and Thursday night games is too small. Monday night games constitute a sample size one-tenth as large–and Thursday night
games constitute a sample size of one-six hundredth as large–as the sample size of Sunday night games. Card and Dahl [2011] also exclude Monday and
Thursday night games in their empirical analysis. The restricted sample has the advantage of observing judgments by a judge on the same day in different
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losses decrease grant rates (or both) relative to Mondays that do not fall after a game.
Asylum seekers need to navigate complex legal challenges and those without access to representation will have to represent
themselves pro se. Many asylum seekers cannot afford to retain private counsel, which can be both costly and difficult to
obtain, especially for detained asylum seekers, who cannot work to pay legal counsel fees. Free or low-cost legal representation
is scarce in rural areas where detention centers are sometimes located, and federal funding restrictions limit the availability of
legal services for asylum seekers (Ardalan [2014]).
2.2 Federal Sentencing Data
We obtain data on criminal sentencing by federal district judges from TRAC. Extensive description of these data is available
elsewhere (Yang [2014]) and Appendix K. In brief, federal district judges hear cases involving federal law and cases prosecuted
by federal agencies. The roughly 700 judges are appointed for life by the U.S. President and confirmed by the Senate. The
district court judgeships are among the most prestigious and revered judicial posts, only below that of the roughly 180 circuit
court judgeships and the 9 on the Supreme Court. Thus, it becomes more hopeful that these judges would be more experienced
and less susceptible to behavioral biases.
Criminal cases are prosecuted by the US Attorney, also politically appointed by the President. According to statistics
from a recent study, 96% of defendants plead guilty, so there is no jury and only the sentence remains to be determined; 32%
of cases have federal public defenders and another 21% have private counsel (McConnell and Rasul [2017]). The data span
1971 through 2012. For earlier years, we have only a selection of sentences, and very few before 1998. In total, there are
approximately 900,000 cases.
The data contain information on prison sentences, probation sentences, fines, and the death penalty. The death penalty is
exceedingly rare in federal cases (71 cases). Monetary fines are mostly very small relative to prison sentences. The median
non-zero monetary fine is $2,000, and the 90th percentile is $15,000. We thus ignore them, and focus exclusively on prison
sentences and probation.
The U.S. federal sentencing guidelines also help limit judicial discretion in sentencing. The guidelines specify a minimum
and maximum sentence depending on offense severity and criminal history. However, judges can deviate from the guidelines
if they find mitigating circumstances, such as family responsibilities, good work, prior rehabilitation, or diminished capacity.
Probation is another means with which a judge can mitigate discipline. Prior to the federal sentencing guidelines, probation
would delay the imposition or execution of sentence. If a defendant violated a condition of probation, the court had the option
to revoke probation and impose the prison sentence previously stayed. Probation as a means to "suspend" the sentence was
abolished with the Sentencing Reform Act (1984), which recognized probation as a sentence in itself.
years, and judgments of different judges on the same day in a given year.
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2.3 NFL Data
The article focuses on professional football because it is the most popular sport in the U.S.10 We merged the asylum and
sentencing data with NFL outcome data. As nearly all NFL games are played on Sundays, we dropped all other game days to
keep the sample homogenous. We matched the courthouse of the judge to the NFL team most favored by the local community
in 2013 according to Facebook likes.11 Likewise, Card and Dahl [2011] assign all residents of a state to their “local” NFL
team. They argue that “Weaker emotional cues presumably lead to attenuated estimates of the effect of wins versus losses. We
suspect that our assignment procedure is likely to lead to a conservative assessment of the effect of emotional cues on family
violence.” They use 6 NFL teams (our sample includes 28). We do not know the personal preference of any given judge. We
considered surveying the immigration judges, but figured that asking the judges about their sports preferences would generate
a near zero response rate. While it is reasonable to guess that a judge who cares about football would follow the local team,
he or she may not, and in fact may not care about football at all. The lack of separate information on judges’ preferences also
prevents disentangling whether sports influence decisions directly through the judges’ mood, or through their environment
or the other court house participants. However, we can use the sample of asylum cases that are resolved without lawyer
representation. Moreover, the birth state of district judges (but not asylum judges) are available from the Federal Judiciary
Center. More salient effects for judges who are likely fans of the NFL team, proxied using the location of their birth, would
be suggestive that the effects are due to judge decision-making as opposed to the game or weather outcomes affecting other
court participants such as lawyer behavior.
2.4 Weather
We use weather data from the National Weather Service. To combine the weather data with the courts data, we merge on date
and location. We used rainfall, high winds, and snow.
This article does not claim that sports and weather are the main determinants of people’s moods. But among the plausible
influences on mood, they are ones we can actually measure for a large number of cases. The public has no access to data on
judges’ health status, family events, commuter traffic, etc. Other events, such as stock market crashes or terrorist attacks, are
measurable and will likely have a much stronger effect on mood than weather or sports, but the sample size is (fortunately)
much too small.
2.5 Power
Based on prior research on intra-judge differences, one important factor predicting case outcomes is the identity of the judge.
There are 340 immigration judges in the asylum data set, compared to 1,268 district judges in the sentencing data set. More-
over, all asylum cases have the same binary potential outcome, while sentencing cases present vastly differing potential
10This is confirmed by google search trends.
https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&geo=US&q=NFL,NBA,MLB,NHL
11Cf. http://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-data-science/nfl-fans-on-facebook/10151298370823859. This method is reasonable since 94% of the data
are between 1996-2013.
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sentence ranges. To appreciate the demands on sample size, consider the following numbers. The asylum and sentencing data
sets are the largest case data sets we am aware of, at present. The relevant subset of comparable decisions after a football
game, however, only comprises 58,000 sentencing and 22,000 asylum decisions, respectively. A 1% treatment effect is thus
110 additional grant decisions in the treatment group relative to the control group. If we had only a tenth of the overall sample
size, a mere 10 such additional decisions in the control and treatment group, respectively, could create the misleading appear-
ance of a 1% treatment effect and would prevent any reasonable inference from such a smaller sample. We would not be able
to claim with any certainty that the 1% estimated effect is a true effect or mere noise. Comparability of the underlying cases
greatly facilitates bounding the probability of a chance result. Similarly, if we had at least a fairly good estimate of what the
decisions should be absent the treatment, the actual difference would provide a fairly good estimate of the treatment effect.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for all variables in the two datasets. Summary statistics for court cases and NFL
outcomes are summarized over the data analysis sample restricted to Mondays after NFL games. The weather data is summa-
rized for the entire data analysis frame. Appendix B presents distributions for cities, the teams, and over time.12 Appendix C
presents motivating bivariate tests of the data for interested readers.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Asylum Sentencing
µ σ1 µ σ1
Grant 39%
Defensive 39%
Lawyer 90%
Any Prison 88%
Probation Length in Days2 40 28
Drug 35%
Trial 5%
NFL Win 50% 51%
Upset Loss 7% 8%
Close Loss 25% 22%
Upset Win 9% 7%
Predicted Win 27% 32%
Predicted Close 47% 43%
Predicted Loss 26% 25%
Snow present 4% 4%
Snow amount in mm2 40 50 40 51
Rain (may include freezing rain) present 38% 32%
Precipitation in mm2 92 139 91 147
Highwinds present 0.3% 0.4%
Windspeed (tenths of meters per second)2 40 18 35 16
Notes: 1Standard deviations only presented for continuous variables. 2Summarized for positive values.
12The percent of decisions occurring after games predicted to win is higher for sentencing. This is because district court sentencing decisions occur in
regions and time periods more enthusiastic of teams predicted to win. For example, Dallas Cowboys is matched to 29% of the sentencing data but only 4%
of the asylum data.
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2.6 (Quasi-)Random Assignment
Obviously, the outcomes and characteristics of asylum cases do not influence NFL outcomes (neither directly nor through
scheduling) or the weather. It is conceivable that case scheduling adjusts to NFL scheduling, outcomes, or the weather. For
a number of reasons, however, this is extremely unlikely. First, we have learned from conversations with practitioners that
the main merit hearings in asylum cases are scheduled first-in first-out, leaving no role for discretionary adjustments. Second,
even if there were such room, it seems implausible that NFL and the weather would enter the picture. In fact, many cases
are scheduled so far in advance that not even the NFL schedule, let alone the result or the day’s weather, would be known
at the time of scheduling. The NFL schedule comes out in April13, while asylum cases may be scheduled over a year in
advance. Third, once scheduled, the main hearing date is essentially set in stone, and decisions are rendered on the spot in
almost all cases. Finally, we verify empirically that cases heard after NFL wins are not statistically different on observable
case characteristics (other than the grant decision) from cases heard after losses.
It is not easy to conceive of third factors that might influence both (unobserved) asylum case characteristics and NFL
outcomes, let alone the weather. Perhaps cities that become wealthier attract (or cultivate) both a better football team and a
more sophisticated set of asylum petitioners. The latter would be attracted by higher wages (although one might also think
that economic migrants are unlikely to obtain asylum). The former would be attracted by the higher purchasing power and the
concomitantly higher advertisement revenue. We account for this possibility by controlling flexibly for city time trends.
As prima facie evidence, we present regression discontinuity plots of the data. NFL outcomes make it easy to present a
discontinuity graphically, especially for outcomes that are easy to classify like the granting of asylum. Figure 1 shows the
grant rate plotted against the point differential in NFL games. We present a local polynomial regression overlaid on the raw
data that is jittered.14 Losses occur to the left of a 0 and wins occur to the right. An increase in the grant rate occurs when the
court city’s NFL team on the night before wins. The confidence intervals are wider to the edges since very few games have
high realized point differentials.15
13See, e.g., http://www.nfl.com/photoessays/0ap1000000161578.
14The grant rate is jittered to more clearly present the mass of data (grant rates are usually 0 or 1 for any given judge on a given day) and thus will
occasionally appear outside [0,1].
15Interestingly, further away from 0, the effect is less clear. This could be related to expectations.
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Figure 1: NFL & Asylum: Grant rates by point differences
Figure 2 shows the imprisonment rate and the probation sentence length plotted against the point differential in NFL
games.
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Figure 2: NFL & Sentencing: Prison and probation by point differences
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3 Asylum Courts
3.1 Wins vs. Losses
We begin with the effect of NFL football wins vs. losses. For the reasons mentioned, we restrict the sample to asylum cases
decided on Mondays after Sunday games. The sample is further collapsed to judge-city-day16 and not every judge sits on a
case on a Monday after NFL. We then present the effect of wins vs. no game and losses vs. no game, and finally, the effects
of unexpected losses.
Table 2 estimates a fixed effects regression for applicants we, judges j, cities c, and decision date t of the following form:
Grantratiojct = baseratejc + δTct + β1Xjct + β2calendart + jct
Grantratio is the ratio of grants to the number of decisions handed down by the judge in a given court house on a
given day (that is, this reduces the dataset to at most one observation per judge per day). Baseratejc is a fixed effect for
judge j sitting in city c. Tct indicates the treatment and δ the coefficient of interest (e.g., win or loss). Xjct is a vector
of average applicant covariates for the applicants who appeared before the judge in that court on that day. In particular, it
contains whether the claim was defensive or affirmative, and whether the applicant was legally represented. We also include
the fraction of applicants who were of the most frequent nationality.17 Calendart is a collection of calendar dummies for
each week of the year (1-52) and for each NFL season between 1992 and 2013. jct is an error term.
The case covariates Xjct are not required for identification. In fact, as already mentioned, we test that they are randomly
distributed across treatment and control groups identified by Tct. A separate issue is dependence of observations from the
same city and, a fortiori, same judge. The standard way of dealing with dependence of observations is clustering. There are
two levels at which cases are not independent, and they are not nested: the judge, and the city. we thus cluster either by city,
judge, or both.18 It hardly matters which way we cluster. In fact, we have found that the clustering surprisingly has only a
small effect compared to no clustering.
16For example, if judge Smith granted four applications and denied one on 4/15/2013 in Newark and granted one in New York City, we would collapse this
into two data points: one data point Smith-Newark-4/15/2013 with value 0.8, and one data point Smith-NYC-4/15/2013 with value 1.
17In the full sample, Chinese are over 20% of the applicants and by far the largest group. No subnational disaggregation is available. The next largest
group is 7%.
18The results are similar clustering by judge, so we just present clustering by both city and judge.
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Table 2: Main NFL Regressions
Dependent variable Judge-City-Day Ratio of Granted Asylum
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Yesterday’s NFL Win 0.019** 0.017* 0.018* 0.016** 0.014* 0.013* 0.013*
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Judge Fixed Effects X X
City Fixed Effects X
JudgeXCity Fixed Effects X X X X X
Season Fixed Effects X
JudgeXSeason Fixed Effects X X X
Week Fixed Effects X X
Application controls X
N 13504 13504 13504 13504 13504 13504 13504
R2 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.44 0.44 0.46
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01) clustered at the judge and city level.
Controlling for application characteristics, the estimated effect of an NFL win is 1.3%. With only judge fixed effects,
the estimated effect is slightly larger, namely 1.9%. The difference between the two estimates is not statistically significant
however. The estimated effect is stable with the gradual inclusion of controls, assuaging concerns of omitted variables.
Table 2 does not yet explicitly address the concern that applicant pools and NFL teams may develop in parallel. Table 3
explicitly addresses this possibility in two different ways. Models 1 and 2 include city-specific time trends, i.e., a separate
time trend for each city. Here the coefficient stays at 1.4%. However, the city-specific polynomial trend is rather crude.19 A
more flexible way to account for unobserved common trends is to match a decision to its nearest neighbor. That is, rather
than imposing a particular polynomial model, we compare each decision to the closest decision by the same judge in the
same city after the opposite game result. For example, if the city’s team lost on weekend 47, we compare the decision on the
following Monday to decisions after the nearest win(s): weekend 46 and 48, if any; if not, weekend 45 and 49, if any; and so
on. Technically, this is a matching estimator (Abadie and Imbens [2006]). Model 3 requires an exact match on judge, city, and
half-decade. Model 4 further requires the comparison be made to a match found within three months. This restriction hardly
matters. The estimated effect is 1.9%. To address concerns of omitted variables another way, Appendix D presents the results
of “placebo regressions” (balancing checks) using the application controls as the “outcome” variable.
19The city-specific seasonal trends include linear, quadratic, cubic, and quartic terms.
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Table 3: NFL Regressions with flexible time controls
Estimation technique OLS Nearest-neighbor matching
Dependent variable Judge-City-Day Ratio of Granted Asylum
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Yesterday’s NFL Win 0.014* 0.014* 0.019* 0.019*
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Fixed Effects / Exact Match JudgeXCity JudgeXCityXHalfDecade
Time control City-specific trends Match on date
Time restriction Within 3 months
Week Fixed Effects X X
Season Fixed Effects X X
Application controls X X
N 13504 13504 7474 6832
Clustering City +Judge
Number of clusters 56 56x340
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01).
Appendix D also reports attenuation and anticipation estimates. The point estimates for the “effect” of Sunday night NFL
games on the Friday before or on Tuesday decisions are very small with similar standard errors, which assuages concerns
of the main estimated effects being due to statistical noise. Appendix E reports that no significant differences are found for
whether the NFL team and the courthouse are in the same city20, whether the game is played in the home city, or whether the
game is a playoff game. These results suggest the mechanism is not due to fans attending the game.
3.2 Impacts of Wins vs. Impacts of Losses
Table 4 asks the separate question of the effects of (1) a loss, and (2) a win, compared to Mondays after non-game Sundays.
We could then see if the effects of winning and losing are asymmetric. For example, if judges barely changed their decisions
after a win as compared with an “untreated” Monday after non-game Sunday, but reacted negatively to losing (or vice versa),
that might lead to a more complete understanding of the underlying psychology of mood. The estimation sample is the set
of Mondays that occur through the NFL season. The results look largely due to losses. This is consistent with fans who
experience loss aversion.
20There are 56 cities and 24 teams matched to asylum data.
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Table 4: NFL Regressions with all Mondays
Dependent variable Judge-City-Day Ratio of Granted Asylum
(1) (2)
Yesterday’s NFL Win 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.006)
Yesterday’s NFL Loss -0.014** -0.014**
(0.006) (0.006)
JudgeXCity Fixed Effects X X
City-specific trends X X
Week Fixed Effects X X
Season Fixed Effects X X
Application controls X X
N 21468 21468
Clustering City +Judge
Number of clusters 56 56x340
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01).
3.3 Impacts of Upset Losses
Table 5 investigates the effects of unexpected losses. Card and Dahl [2011] regressed domestic violence on indicators for
upset loss, close loss, upset win, predicted win, predicted close, and predicted loss. Eren and Mocan [2018] do the same with
juvenile sentencing. In order to as close as possible to these prior and parallel work such that each counts as a replication of
the other, using the same specification, we find that in asylum decisions, an upset loss leads to 2.5% decline in the grant ratio.
The point estimate of the effect of a loss when the game is predicted to be close is small with similar magnitude of standard
errors. The estimated effects of an upset win are also small and not significantly different from 0. Card and Dahl [2011] and
Eren and Mocan [2018] also report significant effects of upset losses and no significant impacts of close losses or upset wins.
The coefficients associated with the range of the spread are significantly different from 0 and are potentially interesting, but
less easily interpreted, since they may be correlated with other factors associated with the asylum grant rate. The coefficient
is stable in more parsimonious models, which are presented in Appendix F.
16
Table 5: NFL Regressions with Mondays after NFL games
Dependent variable Judge-City-Day Ratio of Granted Asylum
(1) (2)
Loss X Predicted Win (Upset Loss) -0.025** -0.025**
(0.011) (0.012)
Loss X Predicted Close (Close Loss) 0.002 0.002
(0.011) (0.012)
Win X Predicted Loss (Upset Win) 0.002 0.002
(0.011) (0.013)
Predicted Win 0.053*** 0.053***
(0.012) (0.012)
Predicted Close 0.027** 0.027**
(0.012) (0.013)
JudgeXCity Fixed Effects X X
City-specific trends X X
Week Fixed Effects X X
Season Fixed Effects X X
Application controls X X
N 21468 21468
Clustering City +Judge
Number of clusters 56 56x340
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Predicted Win indicates a point spread of -4 or
less, Predicted Close indicates a point spread between -4 and 4 (exclusive), and Predicted Loss stands for a point spread of 4
or more. Predicted Loss is the omitted category.
3.4 Heterogeneity
This section examines whether the effects of NFL games are larger for unrepresented parties. This type of analysis would be
suggestive that the effects are due to judge decision-making as opposed to the game outcomes affecting other court participants
such as lawyer behavior.
The results are striking. NFL football games affect asylum cases more for unrepresented applicants. Table 6 shows that
NFL outcomes affect the grant likelihood by 3.7% for defendants without lawyer representation. The effect of NFL win on
unrepresented parties is statistically significant at the 1% level. When there is a lawyer, there is essentially no effect of the
NFL outcome. The interaction term is statistically significant at the 10% level. Models 2 and 3 present the results for the
sample with and without lawyers, which effectively fully interacts the controls with the presence of a lawyer. Appendix G
shows the estimated coefficient is stable across model specifications, which assuages concerns of omitted variables that vary
with the presence of a lawyer and the NFL win.
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Table 6: Effect of NFL Outcomes by Lawyer Representation
Dependent variable Granted Asylum
(1) (2) (3)
Yesterday’s NFL Win 0.037*** 0.006 0.027**
(0.014) (0.008) (0.012)
Yesterday’s NFL Win X Lawyer -0.032*
(0.017)
Lawyer 0.186***
(0.022)
JudgeXCity Fixed Effects X X X
City-specific trends X X X
Week Fixed Effects X X X
Season Fixed Effects X X X
Application Controls X X X
N 22282 20058 2224
Sample All With Lawyer Without Lawyer
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Standard errors are clustered by city.
Observations are at the decision level.
This finding is consistent with the presence of lawyers overcoming the behavioral biases of judges, for example, by
increasing the judge’s attention to the case. It is also consistent with behavioral biases playing a larger role when judges are
nearly indifferent for more disadvantaged applicants (Eren and Mocan [2018]). This leads us to suspect the NFL effects are
not due to the lawyer behavior.
Table 7 reports a similar finding with unexpected outcomes. Upset losses affect the grant likelihood by 6.6% for defendants
without representation. Interestingly, close losses also affect the grant likelihood for defendants without representation, by
4.6%. When there is a lawyer, there is essentially no effect of the NFL outcome. The interaction terms are statistically
significant at the 5% level. Models 2 and 3 present the results for the sample with and without lawyers, to fully interact the
controls with the presence of a lawyer.
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Table 7: Effect of Unexpected NFL Outcomes by Lawyer Representation
Dependent variable Granted Asylum
(1) (2) (3)
Loss X Predicted Win (Upset Loss) -0.066*** -0.007 -0.067**
(0.022) (0.011) (0.030)
Loss X Predicted Win (Upset Loss) 0.061**
Lawyer (0.023)
Loss X Predicted Close (Close Loss) -0.046** 0.008 -0.045**
(0.022) (0.011) (0.021)
Loss X Predicted Close (Close Loss) 0.054**
Lawyer (0.024)
Win X Predicted Loss (Upset Win) -0.023 -0.001 -0.036
(0.035) (0.015) (0.032)
Win X Predicted Loss (Upset Win) 0.020
Lawyer (0.036)
JudgeXCity Fixed Effects X X X
City-specific trends X X X
Week Fixed Effects X X X
Season Fixed Effects X X X
Application Controls X X X
N 22167 19948 2219
Sample All With Lawyer Without Lawyer
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Standard errors are clustered by city.
Observations are at the decision level. Predicted Win indicates a point spread of -4 or less, Predicted Close indicates a point
spread between -4 and 4 (exclusive), and Predicted Loss stands for a point spread of 4 or more. Predicted Loss is the omitted
category. All level terms, such as Predicted Win and Predicted Close, are included.
3.5 Weather
Table 8 looks at the effect of three types of bad weather on the day of the decision: rain, snow, and high winds. In each case,
we have not only a dummy from the national weather service, but also a continuous variable measuring the intensity. We
include city by week fixed effects so the weather variables are measured as a deviation from the norm for that week in that
city. We include city by season fixed effects to control for trends in weather by city. We also include application controls, day
of week fixed effects, and judge fixed effects. Thus, these effects capture intra-judge variation in asylum decisions. We again
cluster the standard errors by city.
As can be seen, all three types of bad weather present reduce the grant rate. For example, the presence of snow reduces
the grant rate by 1.0% and the effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. The presence of rain reduces grant rate by
0.2% but the effect is not statistically significant. The presence of high winds reduces grant rate by 2.3% and the effect is
statistically significant at the 5% level. The intensity of bad weather does not have a statistically significant impact controlling
for the presence of the bad weather. The F-test of joint significance rejects the null hypothesis of no effect in Columns 1, 3,
and 4. Appendix H presents specifications to be comparable to the previous sections (judge by city and judge by season fixed
effects). It hardly matters. Appendix H also presents a placebo regression with the lawyer representation. No effect is found
for whether there is a lawyer.
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Table 8: Judicial Decisions and Today’s Weather
Dependent variable Judge-City-Day Ratio of
Granted Asylum
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Snow present -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.003) (0.004)
Snow amount in mm1 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Rain (may include freezing rain) -0.002 -0.001
present (0.002) (0.002)
Precipitation in mm1 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Highwinds present -0.023** -0.024**
(0.010) (0.010)
Windspeed (tenths of meters 0.002 0.002
per second)1 (0.003) (0.003)
F-Test of Joint Significance 0.020 0.372 0.074 0.005
Judge Fixed Effects X X X X
CityXWeek Fixed Effects X X X X
CityXSeason Fixed Effects X X X X
Application Controls X X X X
Day of Week Fixed Effects X X X X
N 239741 239741 239741 239741
R2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Standard errors are clustered by city.
Observations are at the judge x day x city level. 1Log of the underlying value+1.
We also checked if decisions for unrepresented parties are more affected by the weather. There are no statistically sig-
nificant different weather effects for the two groups. One reason could be that the impact of weather is not overcome by a
lawyers’ presence. Another is that asylum applicants are affected by the weather—in a manner that does not happen with NFL
games, which may be less relevant to asylum applicants—regardless of whether the lawyer is present.
4 Sentencing Decisions
4.1 Linear Regression
A first question is if and to what extent the results generalize to other judicial settings. As already mentioned, immigration
courts are rather special. They have an extremely high workload, the judges are not life-tenured judges, and the applicable
legal standard is rather loose.
We thus ran similar tests with the federal sentencing decisions. The results are in Table 9. Two things are immediately
apparent. First, the estimated coefficients are negative. That is, as with asylum decisions, judges appear to be, if anything,
20
Table 9: NFL and Sentencing Regressions with flexible time controls
Dependent variable Any Prison Probation Length1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Yesterday’s NFL Win -0.006** -0.006** 0.050** 0.050**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.020) (0.020)
JudgeXCity Fixed Effects X X X X
DistrictXSeason Fixed Effects X X X X
Case controls X X X X
Week Fixed Effects X X X X
Yesterday’s NFL Game X X X X
N 208,126 208,126 208,125 208,125
R2 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
Clustering District +Judge District +Judge
Number of clusters 94 94x1344 94 94x1344
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Dependent variables are any prison sentence,
log of probation sentence length, and whether the primary offense was for drugs (trafficking, communication, or possession).
Case controls are whether or not the case was tried and—except in the drugs regression—the department of the offense
classification. Regressions are restricted to Monday decisions and control for having an NFL game yesterday.
more lenient after a positive sports outcome. Controlling for defendant characteristics and flexible time trends, the estimated
effect of an NFL win on imprisonment rates is a reduction of 0.6%, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. Judges
also assign probation lengths that are 5% longer, also statistically significant at the 5% level. For federal felony convictions,
probation is probably an indicator of lenience, as probation is often imposed as a substitute for imprisonment and there are
functionally inexhaustible resources at the Federal level for incarceration.
We next run similar tests with expectations. Notably, we replicate the findings that upset losses drive the results. Estimates
are present in Table 10. The estimated effect of an NFL upset loss on imprisonment rates is an increase of 1.6%, which is
statistically significant at the 1% level. Judges also assign probation lengths that are 11% shorter, also statistically significant
at the 1% level. The result is likely due to judges handing out more prison sentences and less probation sentences, since 99%
of individuals with any prison sentence have zero probation sentence lengths, while 88% of individuals who do not receive a
prison sentence have a positive probation sentence. In these regressions, case controls are whether or not the case was tried and
the department of the offense classification. Regressions are restricted to Monday decisions after an NFL game.21 Appendix I
presents specifications to be comparable to the asylum analysis (judge by season fixed effects). It hardly matters. Appendix I
also presents a placebo regression—no effect is found for whether the primary offense was for drugs. The point estimates are
small and the standard errors similar in size to the first binary regression.
Turning to the mechanism, we cannot estimate a specification with unrepresented defendants (since lawyers are required).
21As before, the coefficients associated with the range of the spread are significantly different from 0 and are potentially interesting, but less easily
interpreted, since they may be correlated with other factors associated with sentencing outcomes.
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Table 10: NFL and Sentencing Regressions with flexible time controls
Dependent variable Any Prison Probation Length1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Loss X Predicted Win (Upset Loss) 0.016*** 0.016*** -0.109*** -0.109***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.039) (0.039)
Loss X Predicted Close (Close Loss) -0.002 -0.002 0.008 0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.028) (0.028)
Win X Predicted Loss (Upset Win) -0.004 -0.004 0.050 0.050
(0.008) (0.009) (0.047) (0.047)
Predicted Win -0.012*** -0.012*** 0.071** 0.071**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.033) (0.033)
Predicted Close -0.007 -0.007 0.059 0.059
(0.005) (0.005) (0.037) (0.037)
JudgeXCity Fixed Effects X X X X
DistrictXSeason Fixed Effects X X X X
Case controls X X X X
Week Fixed Effects X X X X
N 57037 57037 57036 57036
R2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
Clustering District +Judge District +Judge
Number of clusters 94 94x1344 94 94x1344
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Predicted Win indicates a point spread of -4 or
less, Predicted Close indicates a point spread between -4 and 4 (exclusive), and Predicted Loss stands for a point spread of 4
or more. Predicted Loss is the omitted category. 1Log of probation length in days+1.
Instead, we exploit the fact that judges are more likely to be fans of an NFL team if the formative years of childhood are in
the area of the NFL team. This type of analysis would further support the inference that the effects are due to judge decision-
making as opposed to the game outcomes affecting other court participants. The results are again striking. NFL football games
affect judicial decisions more saliently for judges born in the state of the courthouse. The effect is not statistically significant
for those born in a different state. Table 11 shows the effects are statistically significant at the 1% level for judges born in the
same state. Here we only present models that cluster standard errors at the district court level as the results are essentially
identical also clustering at the judge level, as we see in the previous two tables.
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Table 11: NFL and Sentencing Regressions by Judge Born-in-State
Dependent variable Any Prison Probation Length1 Any Prison Probation Length1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Loss X Predicted Win (Upset Loss) 0.020** -0.145*** 0.011 -0.042
(0.008) (0.051) (0.008) (0.060)
Loss X Predicted Close (Close Loss) 0.000 -0.004 -0.007 0.028
(0.005) (0.034) (0.006) (0.038)
Win X Predicted Loss (Upset Win) -0.004 0.038 -0.003 0.074
(0.010) (0.063) (0.011) (0.065)
Predicted Win -0.013 0.069 -0.010 0.058
(0.008) (0.053) (0.008) (0.059)
Predicted Close -0.009 0.062 -0.002 0.045
(0.007) (0.047) (0.008) (0.051)
JudgeXCity Fixed Effects X X X X
DistrictXSeason Fixed Effects X X X X
Case controls X X X X
Week Fixed Effects X X X X
N 32654 32654 24383 24382
R2 0.223 0.221 0.245 0.232
Clustering District District District District
Number of clusters 94 94 94 94
Sample Born In State Born Out-of-State
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Predicted Win indicates a point spread of -4 or
less, Predicted Close indicates a point spread between -4 and 4 (exclusive), and Predicted Loss stands for a point spread of 4
or more. Predicted Loss is the omitted category. Columns 1-2 are limited to the judges born in the same state and Columns
3-4 are limited to judges born out of the state. 1Log of probation length in days+1.
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In the final replication of the asylum results, we assess the impact of bad weather on federal sentencing decisions. As
can be seen in Table 12, the impact of bad weather on imprisonment is jointly significant at the 5% level. For example, the
presence of rain increases imprisonment rate by 0.2% and the effect is statistically significant at the 10% level. The presence
of high winds increases imprisonment rate by 0.9% and the effect is statistically significant at the 10% level. The F-test of
joint significance rejects the null hypothesis of no effect on probation sentence length.
Table 12: Sentencing Decisions and Today’s Weather
Dependent variable Any Prison Probation Length2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Snow present -0.004 -0.004 0.035
(0.003) (0.003) (0.022)
Snow amount in mm1 -0.001 -0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
Rain (may include freezing rain) 0.002** 0.002* -0.011
present (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
Precipitation in mm1 -0.0005* -0.0004 0.003
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.002)
Highwinds present 0.008 0.009* -0.043
(0.005) (0.005) (0.037)
Windspeed (tenths of meters 0.001 0.001 -0.004
per second)1 (0.001) (0.001) (0.006)
F-Test of Joint Significance 0.114 0.108 0.199 0.022 0.093
Judge Fixed Effects X X X X X
CityXWeek Fixed Effects X X X X X
DistrictXSeason Fixed Effects X X X X X
Case controls X X X X X
Day of Week Fixed Effects X X X X X
N 916129 916129 916129 916129 916129
R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Standard errors are clustered by city. 1Log of
the underlying value+1. 2Log of probation length in days+1.
The effects of bad weather are weaker in the federal district courts than in the asylum courts, perhaps because the federal
district court judges are more professionalized.
5 Random Forest Modeling and Orthogonalized Machine Learning
In this section we explore whether machine learning can be used to detect extraneous factors, such as sports or weather. We
look past the recommended sentencing range and predict the sentence length within this range. We investigate sentence length
percentile relative to the sentence guideline range as a dependent variable. This standardization allows us to look at where
within a guideline range a sentence falls. The interpretation of this percentile measure is described in Table 13 below.
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< 0% 0%− 50% 50%− 100% > 100%
sentence
length
below guideline min-
imum (rare)
between guide-
line minimum and
midpoint
between guide-
line midpoint and
maximum
above guideline max-
imum (rare)
Table 13: Interpretation of Range Percentile Measure
The details of the data sources and processing are given in Appendix K. To preview our results, Figure 3 shows marginal
correlations between ML-selected weather features and the sentence percentile. The raw data suggests a U-shape pattern
between maximum temperature for the day and judicial decisions. Such a dependency is also supported by Chen and Eagel
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Figure 3: left panel We fit a generalized additive model to just the temperature to explore the marginal effects of the maximal
temperature. Overlaid are the average values for the sentence percentile in bins of width 0.01, as long as the sample size is
above n = 500. The histogram plays the equivalent of a rugplot and shows the distribution of the data on an arbitrary y scale.
right panel Same for the maximum precipitation
[2017] who show that temperature is an important feature for asylum decisions. When it is too hot or too cold, asylum
grant rates fall. Card and Dahl [2011] also report that domestic violence increases when the maximum temperature is over
80 degrees Fahrenheit. As the temperature and mood link seem to be validated, in Appendix J we check the effect of NFL
outcomes and snow, rain, and winds on twitter mood data measured daily for 1 year across 8 cities using data from Mislove
et al. [2010]. NFL wins the day before improve mood, and the effect is statistically significant at the 10% level. The F-test
of joint significance rejects the null hypothesis of no effect from bad weather. For example, the presence of high winds
decreases mood, an impact that is statistically significantly at the 1% level. Baylis [2018] also documents a U-shape between
temperature and sentiment measured in twitter.
For our machine learning exercise, we compared the performance of three models, Random Forests (RF), Linear Regres-
sion and Gradient Boosting, and found that RF performed the best. We utilized parameter tuning to choose the best model
from this hypothesis space. The optimal hyperparameters we found were min-samples-leaf = 9 and max-features = 0.6 (60%
of features used in each node split). Random forests have become a highly competitive modeling tool, that performs well in
comparison with many standard methods. They are popular, because (i) they can handle large numbers of variables with rela-
tively small numbers of observations, (ii) can be applied to a wide range of prediction problems, even if they are nonlinear and
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involve complex high-order interaction effects, and (iii) produce variable importance measures for each predictor variable.22
Variable Importance
We first introduce variable importance in the context of linear regression with p variables and n observations.
Variable importance is not very well defined as a concept. Even for the case of a linear model with n observations, p
variables and the standard n >> p situation, there is no theoretically defined variable importance metric in the sense of
a parametric quantity that a variable importance estimator should try to estimate (Grömping [2009]). In the absence of a
clearly agreed true value, ad hoc proposals for empirical assessment of variable importance have been made, and desirability
criteria for these have been formulated, for example, decomposition of R2 into nonnegative contributions attributable to each
regressor has been postulated (Grömping [2015]). An important distinction must be drawn between the two extremes of
marginal importance, such as squared correlations versus conditional measures, e.g. squared standardized coefficients or
sequential increase in R2, as critically discussed, for example, by Darlington [1968].
A recurring theme in the literature is that relative importance should balance out conditional and marginal considerations,
a requirement brought forward by Budescu [1993] and later also by Johnson and LeBreton [2004].
Simulating Data
For the sake of illustrating these concepts we generate a simple “linear” data set (no interactions, no nonlinearities)
y = β0 + β1x1 + . . .+ β12x12 (1)
The predictor variables are sampled from a multivariate normal distributionX1, . . . , X12 ∼ N(0,Σ) where the covariance
structure Σ is chosen such that all variables have unit variance σj,j = 1 and only the first four predictor variables are block-
correlated with σj,j′ = 0.9 for j 6= j′ ≤ 4, while the rest are independent with σj,j′ = 0. Of the twelve predictor variables
only six are influential, as indicated by their coefficients in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Population coefficients for simulated data in analogy to Strobl et al. [2008].
Notice the equal magnitudes (importance) of the set of coefficients x1:4 and x5:8 while only x1:4 are correlated. The
zero coefficients x4,8:12 should get no weight which is confirmed by a linear regression. However, because of the imposed
22Chen and Eagel [2017] report that extraneous factors, like weather, have roughly the same random forest importance weight as whether the asylum
applicant has a lawyer or the applicant’s nationality.
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correlation structure, the variable x4 might appear to be related to the dependent variable which could cause a high marginal
variable importance. Generally speaking, for low values of mtry we would expect the correlated predictors to serve as
replacements of the truly influential ones. Figure 5 confirms this expectation and also the diminishing stand-in behavior of
x4 for increasing values of mtry. We further observe that the correlation structure of x1:4 dampens their individual VI scores:
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Figure 5: Permutation Variable Importance as defined in Eq. (3). The color coding is: green for truly nonzero coefficients,
orange for correlated zero-value coefficients and red for all other βj = 0. Note the slight negative values for the importance
scores of the variables with no predictive information.
variables x5:6 are consistently assigned a variable importance which is almost 4 times as high as the one for x1:2.
Variable Importance in Random Forests We assume the reader is familiar with the basic construction of random forests
which are averages of large numbers of individually grown regression/classification trees. The random nature stems from
both “row and column subsampling”: each tree is based on a random subset of the observations, and each split is based on a
random subset of mtry candidate variables. The tuning parameter mtry – which for popular software implementations has the
default bp/3c for regression and √p for classification trees – can have profound effects on prediction quality as well as the to
be introduced variable importance measures.
Our main focus in this paper is the CART algorithm (Breiman et al. [1984], Breiman [2001]) which chooses the split for
each node such that maximum reduction in overall node impurity is achieved. Alternatively, multiplicity-adjusted conditional
tests could be used in the splitting process which avoid the known bias of the CART algorithm towards categorical variables
with different numbers of categories, or differing numbers of missing values (Hothorn et al. [2006], Strobl et al. [2007a]).
These so called conditional inference (CI) trees replace the CART bootstrap row sampling by sampling without-replacement
of size 0.632 · n. In either case, 36.8% of the observations are (on average) not used for an individual tree; those out of bag
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(OOB) samples can serve as a validation set to estimate the test error, e.g.:
E
(
Y − Yˆ
)2
≈ OOBMSE = 1
n
n∑
i=1
(
yi − yˆi,OOB
)2
(2)
where yˆi,OOB is the average prediction for the ith observation from those trees for which this observation was OOB.
The splitting bias that was mentioned above also affects the originally proposed so-called Gini importance for classification
and its analogue, average impurity reduction, for regression forests (Strobl et al. [2007b]). We will adopt the widely used
alternative reduction in MSE when permuting a variable as a measure of variable importance defined as follows:
VI = OOBMSE,perm −OOBMSE (3)
An attempt at a theoretical foundation of variable importance for binary regression trees and forests is given in Ishwaran
et al. [2007]. In related work (Ishwaran et al. [2008]), the authors point out that VI measures do not attempt to directly
estimate the change in prediction error for a forest grown with and without the variable in question. We further note that
the variable importance measure as defined above, has been shown to be closer to a measure of marginal importance rather
than conveying the conditional effect of each variable (Archer and Kimes [2008], Strobl et al. [2008]). It can be shown that
the permutation importance tests a joint hypothesis of independence between Xj and both Y and the remaining predictors
Z : X1, . . . , Xj−1, Xj+1, . . . , Xp: H0 : Xj⊥Y ∧Xj⊥Z. Hence a nonzero importance measure can be caused by a violation
of either part: the independence of Xj and Y , or the independence of Xj and Z. The distinction between conditional and
marginal influence is highly relevant for disentangling causal effects of (groups of) variables. For example, in our case we
would like to make sure that the high variable importances for weather and sports features are not simply due to geographic
or temporal confounding. An alternative conditional permutation scheme is proposed in Strobl et al. [2008] which appears
to mitigate the overestimation of the importance of correlated variables. We refer the reader to Appendix L for the potential
shortcomings of variable importance measures when correlated variables are not taken into account. Next, we describe our
proposed solution to mitigate the confounding effect of correlated variables.
Residualizing
The distinction between marginal and conditional variable importance in multiple linear regression is at the heart of the ceteris
paribus interpretation of the estimated coefficients and covered in all introductory econometrics textbooks. The key insight
we borrow is that the coefficient βˆj does not change when we residualize, i.e. regress xj on the remaining variables xi 6=j . The
effects of this type of residualizing in linear models are well understood though Wurm and Fisicaro [2014] highlights some
undesirable effects. We extend the idea of residualizing in order to uncover the conditional effects of covariates to nonlinear
models in analogy to the recently proposed concept of “Double Machine Learning” (Chernozhukov et al. [2016]). In par-
ticular, for each of the “seemingly unrelated” weather/sports variables xi,SU we train a random forest model using only the
28
%rmse increase
0 1 2 3 4
Permutation Imp, Dummies
district Illinois North
state AZ
district New York East
race Hispanic
probation office MA
sentencing month
educ H.S. Graduate
crime fraud
district California South
minimum temperature
maximum temperature
educ some college
race1
state TX
state NY
crime firearms
state CA
crime immigration
crime drug−trafficking
date
%rmse increase
0 2 4 6 8 10
Permutation Imp, Factor Model
Scored_GameNightBefore
Allowed_GameNightBefore
precipitation
maximum temperature
post Booker
sentencing month
minimum temperature
education
probation office
race
state 
date
district
crimetype
Figure 6: Normalized permutation importance – defined as percent increase in prediction-rmse when randomly shuffling
a variable – for the original dataset without residualizing. We color code “unrelated” variables such as sports and weather
features in red and the remaining variables in blue. left panel Model with dummy coding of factors. right panel Model with
no dummying of categorical variables.
“appropriate features” as explanatory variables. We then replace the original xi,SU feature with the residuals rfRes− xi,SU
from the respective auxiliary RF model. The main idea of this procedure is to remove existing correlations/dependencies
between the two sets of variables and allow an interpretation of variable importance in the traditional sense of “controlling for
XYZ”. The results are promising for the simulated data. Figure 7 demonstrates that residualization appears to report condi-
tional variable importances instead of marginal ones. We now apply the same idea to the court data in order to test whether the
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Figure 7: Permutation Variable Importance as defined in Eq. (3) after replacing variables x4,8:12 with their respective residuals
from random forest models using x1:3,5:7 as features. The color coding is as before.
observed importance scores for seemingly unrelated variables in Figure 6 are robust under this “conditioning procedure”. Fig-
ure 8 shows the normalized permutation importance after each “unrelated” variable is replaced by the corresponding residuals
29
%rmse increase
0 2 4 6 8
Permutation Imp, RF Residuals 
total sunshine
Result_GameNightBefore
GameThatNight
maximum temperature
GameNightBefore
minimum temperature
sentencing month
precipitation
post Booker
education
probation office
race
state 
date
district
crimetype
%rmse increase
0 2 4 6 8
Permutation Imp, Linear Residuals 
sentencing month
maximum temperature
minimum temperature
total sunshine
cloudiness
precipitation
post Booker
education
probation office
date
race
state 
district
crimetype
Figure 8: Normalized permutation importance after each “unrelated” variable is replaced by the corresponding residuals from
a (left panel) random forest or (right panel) linear regression with the “appropriate” features as independent variables.The color
coding is as in Figure 6
.
from a random forest regression and confirms the robustness of the weather/sports feature influence.
Important Features Figure 6 displays the most important features based on a permutation scheme. While dummifying
categorical variables in linear models is well understood, its profound effects on model performance (Nick Dingwall [2016])
and key measures such as variable importance in tree based models are often overlooked. In fact, the majority of software
implementations of random forests require dummy coding of categorical variables23 which makes benchmarking difficult. We
feel that a fair and honest evaluation of the true impact of variables in machine learning needs to communicate both modeling
approaches and their different interpretations. The left panel of Figure 6 evaluates the factor levels individually while the right
panel (no dummy coding) compares the overall contributions of the variables as a whole.
For the dummified model we found the most predictive feature the date of the sentencing decision included both as a
continuous variable as well as a binary feature encoding the 2005 United States Supreme Court decision referred to as United
States v. Booker (Wikipedia [2018]), see also Figure K.7 in Appendix K. For both models, location specific features capture
high importance scores. For the left panel these would be specific states such as CA, NY, TX, AZ and districts 74, 7, 54 while
the factor model yields high scores to state, district and location of probation office.
The most important feature related to the defendant was the crime type, which is a reassuring sign that the judge is using
case specific information in their decision. The dummy model can be more specific w.r.t. the various types of crime and scores
crimes involving drug trafficking, immigration and firearms highest.
We find characteristics of the defendant that arguably should not be important to be among the top 20 most predictive
features, such as race and education level. It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate whether these features truly
influence the judge.
We found some weather features appear in our most predictive features. Temperature maximum and minimum were our
23 https://blog.hwr-berlin.de/codeandstats/categorical-variables-in-trees-i/
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10th/11th as well as 8th/10th most predictive features, respectively. We further found that some sports features, do in fact
predict criminal sentence length to a small degree. It is worth noting that they are due to games that happened the prior day,
not games that are going to happen. In fact we included the same sports features for the decision day but those accumulated no
rmse reduction in predictions. That by itself supports a causal interpretation and the findings reported without using machine
learning.
Null Distribution of Importance Scores
Finally, it is not clear whether the observed smaller positive values of variable importance measures could be due to chance
since there is no a well defined Null distribution for these scores. In order to identify cutoff values above which predictors
would be considered to have a significant impact on model predictions, we have implemented a permutation test which gen-
erates a null distribution of importance scores for each predictor against which the observed importance scores are compared.
This null distribution is created by randomly permuting the response variable (class assignments in a classification model, or
independent continuous response in a regression model) among cases, running the same Random Forest model on the per-
muted data, and storing the resulting importance scores. (Note the computationally demanding nested permutations: an outer
loop permuting the dependent variable and an inner loop shuffling the relevant predictors.) Under this procedure, a predictor
that is not adding any significant information to the model will have an observed importance score that is similar to those
generated by a random shuffling of the response, while a significant predictor will have an importance score much larger than
the null. Significance p-values are then calculated as the fraction of replicates in the null distribution that are greater than or
equal to the observed value.
Results: for the top 20 variables shown in Figure 6, the observed importance scores lie far above the extreme percentiles
of the Null distributions, hence providing strong evidence for their significance.
6 Conclusion
This article has documented—using the universe of U.S. asylum and federal sentencing decisions spanning three decades—
intra-judicial variation caused by extraneous factors, i.e., factors unrelated to the case merits. It is not the “judge’s breakfast”,
but close.
We cannot directly determine whether judges intentionally or unintentionally behave harshly after NFL losses or bad
weather. Nevertheless, the influence of behavioral bias on high-stakes decisions is consistent with revealed preference indif-
ference. First, the effects of NFL games on asylum decisions are driven entirely by unrepresented parties. This means that
the lawyer’s behavior is not driving the results and that the presence of a lawyer is a strong behavioral nudge to a judge to pay
attention to be less indifferent. Second, the effects of NFL games on sentencing decisions are larger for judges likely to be
fans of the NFL team. This suggests that the judge rather than other courtroom actors are explaining these findings.
After presenting the causal evidence, we present methods to interpret and evaluate the causal importance score of features
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in random forests. We begin with non-parametric partial correlation between extraneous factors like temperature and pre-
cipitation with judicial decisions. We then residualize to account for geographic and temporal factors; we compare a linear
residualizing approach with residualizing based on auxiliary random forests. This approach is inspired by the Frisch Waugh
Lovell theorem and also reminiscent of the recent advances in double or orthogonal machine learning (Chernozhukov et al.
[2016]). We consistently find extraneous factors like weather and sports to predict judicial decisions. Notably, when NFL
features other than those happening the day before the decision are used, they are not deemed important by the random forest
(likewise, they were deemed statistically insignificant in the causal regressions). We also examined the Null distribution of
the variable importance scores to make sure that they are not spurious effects.
A justice system reasonably aspires to be consistent in the application of law across cases and to account for the particulars
of a case. In a prediction model of criminal sentence lengths that accounts for non-judicial factors such as weather and sports
events, these features unrelated to crime were predictive of sentence length as well. Future work should investigate whether
the behavioral influence on judicial decision-making is a way to detect judicial indifference and whether personalized nudges
of judges can improve the production of justice.
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A Additional Background on Asylum Judges
Immigration Courts Overview
The immigration judges are part of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), an agency of the Department of
Justice Pol [2014]. At present, there are over 260 immigration judges in 59 immigration courts. In removal proceedings,
immigration judges determine whether an individual from a foreign country (an alien) should be allowed to enter or remain
in the United States or should be removed. Immigration judges are responsible for conducting formal court proceedings and
act independently in deciding the matters before them. They also have jurisdiction to consider various forms of relief from
removal. In a typical removal proceeding, the immigration judge may decide whether an alien is removable (formerly called
deportable) or inadmissible under the law, then may consider whether that alien may avoid removal by accepting voluntary
departure or by qualifying for asylum, cancellation of removal, adjustment of status, protection under the United Nations
Convention Against Torture, or other forms of relief Executive Office for Immigration Review [2014].
Immigration Judges
The immigration judges are attorneys appointed by the Attorney General as administrative judges. They are subject to the su-
pervision of the Attorney General, but otherwise exercise independent judgment and discretion in considering and determining
the cases before them. See INA sec. 101(b)(4) (8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(4)); 8 CFR 1003.10(b), (d). Decisions of the immigration
judges are subject to review by the Board pursuant to 8 CFR 1003.1(a)(1) and (d)(1); in turn, the Board’s decisions can be
reviewed by the Attorney General, as provided in 8 CFR 1003.1(g) and (h). Decisions of the Board and the Attorney Gen-
eral are subject to judicial review Executive Office for Immigration Review [2014]. Many previously worked as immigration
lawyers or at the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for some time before they were appointed.
Proceedings before Immigration Courts
There are two ways an applicant arrives to the Immigration Court. First, the asylum seeker can affirmatively seek asylum by
filing an application. In the event that the Asylum Office did not grant the asylum application24 and referred it to Immigration
Court, the asylum seeker can now pursue his or her asylum claim as a defense to removal in Immigration Court. Second, if the
asylum seeker never filed for asylum with the Asylum Office but rather the government started removal proceedings against
him or her for some other reason, he or she can now pursue an asylum case in Immigration Court Pol [2014]. This latter group
is classified as defensive applicants and includes defendants picked up in immigration raids.
24For application at the Asylum Office, see chapters 14-26 of: http://immigrationequality.org/get-legal-help/our-legal-resources/immigration-equality-
asylum-manual/preface-and-acknowledgements/
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Appendix Figure B.1: Distribution of Teams
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Appendix Figure B.3: Distribution of Cities
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Appendix Figure B.4: Distribution of Teams
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Appendix Figure B.5: Distribution of Seasons
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Appendix Figure B.6: Distribution of Districts
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New HampNevada
NebraskaN. Y., W
N. Y., SN. Y., N
N. Y., EN. J.
N MexicoN Dakota
N Car, WN Car, M
N Car, EMontana
Mo, WMo, E
Miss, SMiss, N
MinnesotaMich, W
Mich, EMass
MarylandMaine
Ken, WKen, E
KansasIowa, S
Iowa, NInd, S
Ind, NIll, S
Ill, NIll, C
IdahoHawaii
Ga, SGa, N
Ga, MFla, S
Fla, NFla, M
DelawareConn
ColoradoCal, S
Cal, NCal, E
Cal, CArk, W
Ark, EArizona
Ala, SAla, N
Ala, M
Notes: Sentencing data restricted to Mondays after NFL games. Enlongated for readability.
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C Preliminary Bivariate Tests and Visualizations
This section presents some simple comparisons. Table C.1 compares mean grant rates on days after a win with grant rates
after a loss. Looking at individual decisions (test 1), the average grant rate after a win is 3.7% higher than after a loss, or
about 10% of the base grant rate. This difference is both economically large and, subject to the very important caveat in the
next paragraph, highly statistically significant. Changing the unit of observation to individual judge-day grant rates (test 2)
or city-day grant rates (test 3) barely changes this result. Similarly, grant rates are strongly positively correlated with wins,
regardless of the level at which the data are pooled (Table C.2).
Appendix Table C.1: Differences in mean grant rates, by NFL win/loss
Level of p-value
aggregation After N Mean (two-sided)
After loss 11101 0.371
(1) Case After win 11193 0.408
Difference -0.037 0.0000
After loss 6676 0.345
(2) Judge-day After win 6795 0.379
Difference -0.034 0.0000
After loss 2596 0.291
(3) City-day After win 2620 0.318
Difference -0.027 0.0099
Appendix Table C.2: Correlations between grant rates and NFL wins / win rates
p-value
Grant rates by N Correlation (two-sided)
Day 13477 0.04 0.0000
Judge & Season 3162 0.05 0.004
Total 340 0.17 0.0013
Day 5216 0.04 0.0099
City & Season 845 0.10 0.0024
Total 56 0.22 0.1105
To be sure, the simple statistical tests treat each case or ratio, as the case may be, as independent. In reality, however,
observations from the same city and even more so from the same judge are subject to many of the same influences from
unobserved factors. Moreover, the argument that NFL wins are randomly assigned to cases becomes tenuous over long time
periods. As cities get richer, their football teams and asylum applicant pools may both become systematically stronger.
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D Placebo Regressions - Balancing Checks and Attenuation/Anticipation Regressions
Table D.3 reports placebo regressions using the case covariates (i.e., lawyer, defensive, whether the defendant is from China).
The point estimates are all small and the standard errors similar in size to the main regressions.
Finally, we examine Tuesday decisions after and Friday decisions two days before Sunday NFL games. These regressions
help assess the degree of attenuation or anticipation of the Sunday’s NFL results. We report these results in Table D.4; the
point estimates are all small and the standard errors similar in size as reported in Table 3.
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E Heterogeneity by Location or Time
Table E.5 checks for and finds no significant differences depending on the location of the game and time of year. Note that
the coefficient for “Same city as NFL team” and “Playoffs” are less interpretable as they are associated with, inter alia, factors
associated with grant rates that vary by region or time.
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Appendix Table E.5: Effect of NFL Outcomes by Location or Time
Dependent variable Judge-City-Day Ratio of Granted Asylum
(1) (2) (3)
Yesterday’s NFL Win 0.015*** 0.004 0.011
(0.005) (0.009) (0.007)
Yesterday’s NFL Win X -0.012
Same city as NFL team (0.011)
Same city as NFL team 0.023*
(0.012)
Yesterday’s NFL Win X 0.011
NFL team plays at Home (0.012)
NFL team plays at Home -0.004
(0.008)
Yesterday’s NFL Win X -0.007
Playoffs (0.032)
Playoffs -0.014
(0.023)
JudgeXCity Fixed Effects X X X
City-specific trends X X X
Week Fixed Effects X X X
Season Fixed Effects X X X
Application Controls X X X
N 21346 21346 21346
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Standard errors are clustered by city.
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F Unexpected NFL Outcomes
Table F.6 reports the effect of upset losses across specifications that vary the set of controls. The coefficient is stable across
models.
Appendix Table F.6: NFL Regressions with Mondays after NFL games
Dependent variable Judge-City-Day Ratio of Granted Asylum
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Loss X Predicted Win (Upset Loss) -0.025** -0.029** -0.032*** -0.031***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Loss X Predicted Close (Close Loss) -0.001 -0.008 -0.006 -0.003
(0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
Win X Predicted Loss (Upset Win) 0.002 -0.011 -0.008 -0.005
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Predicted Win 0.054*** 0.044** 0.042** 0.045**
(0.012) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Predicted Close 0.032** 0.027** 0.024* 0.024**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
JudgeXCity Fixed Effects X X X X
Season Fixed Effects X
JudgeXSeason Fixed Effects X X X
Week Fixed Effects X X
Application controls X
N 13422 13422 13422 13418
R2 0.27 0.47 0.47 0.48
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Predicted Win indicates a point spread of -4 or
less, Predicted Close indicates a point spread between -4 and 4 (exclusive), and Predicted Loss stands for a point spread of 4
or more. Predicted Loss is the omitted category.
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G Lawyer Interactions
Table G.7 reports the effect of NFL outcomes by lawyer representation across specifications that vary the application controls
that are also interacted with the presence of legal representation. The coefficients are stable across models.
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Appendix Table G.7: Effect of NFL Outcomes by Lawyer Representation
Dependent variable Granted Asylum
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Yesterday’s NFL Win 0.038*** 0.035** 0.031** 0.035** 0.030**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Yesterday’s NFL Win X -0.033* -0.030* -0.026 -0.030* -0.024
Lawyer (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
JudgeXCity Fixed Effects X X X X X
City-specific trends X X X X X
Week Fixed Effects X X X X X
Season Fixed Effects X X X X X
Application Controls X X X X X
Controls X Lawyer Defensive Origin Week Season All
N 22282 22282 22282 22282 22282
Sample All All All All All
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Standard errors are clustered by city.
Observations are at the decision level.
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H Weather Regressions
Table H.8 reports the effect of weather using a specification similar to the NFL analyses. The results are hardly affected.
52
Appendix Table H.8: Judicial Decisions and Today’s Weather
Dependent variable Judge-City-Day Ratio of
Granted Asylum
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Snow present -0.010*** -0.010**
(0.004) (0.004)
Snow amount in mm1 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Rain (may include freezing rain) -0.002 -0.002
present (0.002) (0.002)
Precipitation in mm1 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Highwinds present -0.022*** -0.023**
(0.008) (0.009)
Windspeed (tenths of meters 0.001 0.002
per second)1 (0.003) (0.003)
F-Test of Joint Significance 0.023 0.584 0.034 0.002
JudgeXCity Fixed Effects X X X X
JudgeXSeason Fixed Effects X X X X
Week Fixed Effects X X X X
Application controls X X X X
N 239253 239253 239253 239253
R2 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Standard errors are clustered by city.
Observations are at the judge x day x city level. 1Log of the underlying value+1.
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Table H.9 presents a placebo regression. No effect is found for whether there is a lawyer.
Appendix Table H.9: Lawyer Representation and Today’s Weather
Dependent variable Judge-City-Day Ratio of
Lawyer Representation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Snow present -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
Snow amount in mm1 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Rain (may include freezing rain) -0.001 -0.002
present (0.001) (0.001)
Precipitation in mm1 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Highwinds present -0.005 -0.005
(0.015) (0.014)
Windspeed (tenths of meters 0.001 0.002
per second)1 (0.001) (0.001)
F-Test of Joint Significance 0.648 0.579 0.390 0.693
Judge Fixed Effects X X X X
CityXWeek Fixed Effects X X X X
CityXSeason Fixed Effects X X X X
Application Controls X X X X
Day of Week Fixed Effects X X X X
N 239741 239741 239741 239741
R2 0.220 0.220 0.220 0.220
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Standard errors are clustered by city.
Observations are at the judge x day x city level. 1Log of the underlying value+1. Application controls omit lawyer
representation.
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I Sentencing and NFL Regressions
Table I.10 reports the effect of NFL outcomes using a specification similar to the asylum analyses. The results are hardly
affected.
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Appendix Table I.10: NFL and Sentencing Regressions with alternative specifications
Dependent variable Any Prison Probation Length1
(1) (3)
Loss X Predicted Win (Upset Loss) 0.014** -0.096**
(0.006) (0.038)
Loss X Predicted Close (Close Loss) -0.003 0.006
(0.004) (0.028)
Win X Predicted Loss (Upset Win) -0.001 0.027
(0.009) (0.053)
Predicted Win -0.011** 0.053
(0.005) (0.036)
Predicted Close -0.007 0.059
(0.006) (0.039)
JudgeXCity Fixed Effects X X
JudgeXSeason Fixed Effects X X
Week Fixed Effects X X
Case controls X X
N 57037 57036
R2 0.34 0.34
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). Standard errors are clustered at the district
level. Predicted Win indicates a point spread of -4 or less, Predicted Close indicates a point spread between -4 and 4
(exclusive), and Predicted Loss stands for a point spread of 4 or more. Predicted Loss is the omitted category. 1Log of
probation length in days+1.
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J Twitter Regressions
The final analysis considers the hypothesized mechanism using a proxy for mood. We examine the effect of NFL outcomes
and bad weather on twitter mood data measured daily for 1 year across 8 cities using data from Mislove et al. [2010]. Table
J.11 reports that NFL wins the day before improve mood, and the effect is statistically significant at the 10% level.25 The
F-test of joint significance rejects the null hypothesis of no effect from bad weather. For example, the presence of high winds
decreases mood, an impact that is statistically significantly at the 1% level. Baylis [2018] also documents a U-shape between
temperature and sentiment measured in twitter.
Appendix Table J.11: Twitter Mood, NFL Outcomes, and Today’s Weather
Dependent variable Tweet Mood (µ = 6.4)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Yesterday’s NFL Win 0.047*** 0.047*
(0.007) (0.023)
Snow present 0.015 0.015
(0.016) (0.019)
Snow amount in mm1 0.012** 0.012
(0.005) (0.007)
Rain (may include freezing rain) -0.041*** -0.041
present (0.004) (0.023)
Precipitation in mm1 -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001)
Highwinds present -0.098*** -0.098***
(0.012) (0.027)
Windspeed (tenths of meters -0.030*** -0.030**
per second)1 (0.003) (0.009)
F-Test of Joint Significance 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00
City Fixed Effects X X X X
CityXWeek Fixed Effects X X
Day of Week Fixed Effects X X
N 1154 1154 25508 25508
R2 0.21 0.21 0.29 0.29
Clustering None City None City
Number of clusters - 8 - 8
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01). 1Log of the underlying value+1.
25Because of the small number of clusters, We also present robust standard errors without clustering. In addition, we execute wild bootstrap for the weaker
result. Following Cameron et al. [2008] renders 95% confidence intervals between .006 and .09 for NFL wins.
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K Sentencing Data
United States District Court
The United States District Courts (USDC) are the judicial backbone for hearing and sentencing federal crimes in the United
States (United States Courts [a]). Federal crimes include illegal activity committed on federal land, crimes committed by
or against federal employees in particular roles, matters involving federal government regulations (e.g., illegal immigration,
federal tax fraud, counterfeiting), or crimes against the U.S. that occur outside of the United States, such as terrorism (United
States Courts [b]). Among federal crimes, the most frequently heard cases involve immigration, drug trafficking, firearms,
and fraud. Most frequently, the defendant in a case enters a plea agreement with the prosecutor, which is then approved of,
or denied, by the judge. Otherwise, a sentencing trial is held and the judge determines the sentence for the criminal to serve:
probation, federal prison, or both. In either situation, the judge has final say on the criminal sentence. There are 94 district
courts in the United States. At least one district court is located in each state or U.S. territory. States that are large or have
a large population have sub-state regional courts instead. The United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) (United States
Sentencing Commission, 2018]), produces the sentencing guidelines for federal judges to use when they make their sentencing
decisions. The judges are given a guideline range for the criminal sentence that is based upon the severity of the crime and
the defendant’s criminal history. Due to these guidelines, the largest factor determining sentence range is the criminal charges
brought to the judge by the prosecutor.
The 2005 United States Supreme Court decision referred to as United States v. Booker court decision determined that
only prior convictions, facts admitted by the defendant, and facts proved to the jury beyond reasonable doubt could be used
to extend the criminal sentence longer than the mandatory maximum. In other words, it introduced situations in which a
judge could prescribe a sentence outside the sentencing range. We believe that this formal decision on opportunities to vary
sentence length encouraged judges to change the way they made this determination. Interesting, while the U.S v. Booker case
questioned the judge’s right to increase the sentence length past the maximum guideline sentence, we saw an overall decrease
in the length of sentence term relative to guideline range. Additionally, the range of minimum and maximum sentences
becomes more extreme, as shown in Appendix Figure K.7.
Discrepancies across choice of criminal charges do not fully explain these disparities. Judges are also known to, for
example, give females a sentence nearer the guideline minimum, or prescribe criminal sentences outside of the guideline
range for males (Mustard [2001]). This motivates our decision to focus on sentence length relative to the recommended
guideline range. For the USDC, the Federal Sentencing Commission writes recommended sentence minimum and maximum
terms to help ensure that convicts who committed similar crimes are charged with similar sentences. As can be seen in the
lookup tables in United States Sentencing Commission, 2018], the severity of the crime and the criminal history of the convict
are used to determine the appropriate sentence range. The judge then determines or approves a sentence length, frequently,
but not necessarily within this range.
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Appendix Figure K.7: Trends in Sentencing Pre and Post US v. Booker.
Data Sources
The United States District Court Federal Sentencing data was made available by the Office of Research and Data in the United
States Sentencing Commission. This data spanned federal court cases from 1992 − 2013. There are 35 features in this data,
characterizing the defendant and crime. We keep 15 of these features due to their interpretability. For those models that cannot
handle categorical features directly, dummy variables were created as needed for features including race/ethnicity, location
and citizenship resulting in a total of 253 features. Our target variable was sentence length percentile relative to the range. We
compute the value using standard normalization.
xnew =
x− xmin
xmax − xmin
As our target variable was defined with the minimum and maximum sentence range, we dropped the minimum and maxi-
mum sentence range features when fitting our model to prevent data leakage.
Weather Data
In order to properly account for the weather in each district on a given day, we used a dataset originating from the NOAA
(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) database. This dataset consists of daily weather for 96 cities from
1992 − 2013. It includes over 90 features that depict various aspects of the weather conditions for each day. However,
many of these features contain missing values, or are merely translations of other features. We chose to include only the
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following features: total daily sunshine and precipitation, maximum and minimum temperature, and average cloudiness.
Sports Data
Sports data available to us included data from MLB (Major League Baseball), NBA (National Basketball Association), NFL
(National Football League), NHL (National Hockey League), and college football (CFB) for the years in which we had
U.S. District Court Data. For the four professional leagues (MLB/NBA/NFL/NHL), there was an instance of each team in
each game played (i.e. each game had two instances). While the features available were not identical across sports they
were generally similar, and included information such as team name, field played on, score, and betting over/under. For the
CFB data, there was one instance per game. Unlike the professional sports data, the CFB data is not as complete. This is
understandable due to the organization of college football competitions. Teams typically play schools of the same size, budget,
and quality of facilities. Due to this, some games played by smaller schools are not recorded. However, the games played by
the Division I schools, the schools with the most developed football programs and likely the greatest regional following, are
well represented. This data included team name, field played on, score, and so on. For each of the five sports datasets, we
tabulated information about the each team per game on the same day as the trial, including the date, team name, whether a
game occurred, and whether the game would be played at the home stadium, or away. We assumed that the judge would not
know the result of the game before the end of the workday.
Our assumption is that the outcome of a game could influence a trial only by games played the day before and aligned
the following features appropriately: whether the game occurred, whether the game would be played at the home stadium or
away, the points scored by the team, the points scored by the opposing team, the score margin (difference between team’s
scores), and whether the team won or lost.
Data Processing
There were several challenges when pre-processing the sports data so that they could be organized into these dataframes. For
example, for the score margin was not included in all data, and was calculated in these cases. The CFB data was organized
differently from the professional sports data, so each instance of a game had to be split between the results per game per
team. A lookup table between the team names and the district that would presumably be interested in that team was curated
manually. For the lookup table to remain useful, several simplifying assumptions had to be made. In the first pass, each team
was paired with the district where their home stadium was located. This meant that major cities such as Los Angeles, which
is located in the Central California District Court district, were represented several times in the lookup table. New York City
was challenging in that Brooklyn falls under the Eastern New York District Court, and the rest of New York City falls under
the Southern New York District Court. In the majority of cases, New York City teams were represented by both districts,
unless Brooklyn had its own team. After each team was paired with its "hometown" district, we induced spatial spread in the
professional sports data. First, in states that have several districts but only one team, the team was paired with all districts in
that state. If a state had several districts and several teams, fandom maps based on Facebook likes were used to determine the
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more popular team in the ambiguous districts in that state. Finally, Boston teams were assigned to all New England districts,
assuming homogeneity of fandom. If a district had no team and no obvious way to induce spread, it was not assigned any
team (e.g., Guam, Puerto Rico, Montana, etc.). Due to the number of CFB teams, and assumptions about college football
fan followings, we did not feel that spreading data outside of the district the school is located in was appropriate or desired.
We choose not to use the betting over/under information included in the professional sports data, though that would be an
interesting area of research worth pursuing. In the college football data, we choose not to include team ranking or whether
the game was a special championship. An interesting future research aim would be to give a heavier weight to championship
games and bowls, presuming that the lead up and results of the games would be more impactful on the community of fans
invested in the game. Similarly, this information could be incorporated into the professional sports data.
Data Merge
To combine the weather data with district courts data, we merge on date and location. The features city and courthouse
correspond to the location in the weather and district courts datasets, respectively. However, we found that the city names differ
between the USDC and weather datasets. In other words, we found many courthouses for which there was no corresponding
weather data. To avoid dropping criminal cases that do not have corresponding weather data, we created our own metadata
to link courthouses in the district data to the nearest city in the weather data. Through this, we were able to precisely merge
the two datasets without loss of information. The schema of this merge includes all district court features, along with weather
features 0-4 in the weather table above.
To merge the sports data with the previously merged district court and weather data, we first dropped team name; we
were interested to see if home-team games affected the judges’ sentence, rather than particular teams. For each of the sports
dataframes described above, we merge over date and district. Each sport is represented separately. If no sports data was
available for any day-district combination, the sports data fields were filled with zeros.
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L Default Variable Importance
For completeness as well as a cautionary tale, in Figure L.8 we also provide the mean decrease in impurity (or gini importance)
scores which happens to be the default choice in most software implementations of random forests. This mean decrease in
impurity importance of a feature is computed as a (weighted) mean of the individual trees’ improvement in the splitting
criterion produced by each variable. A substantial shortcoming of this default measure is its evaluation on the in-bag samples
which can lead to severe overfitting. It was also pointed out by Strobl et al. [2007b] that the variable importance measures of
Breiman’s original Random Forest method ... are not reliable in situations where potential predictor variables vary in their
scale of measurement or their number of categories.
MLB_Scored_GameNightBefore
MLB_Allowed_GameNightBefore
hispanic
NBA_Margin_GameNightBefore
MLB_Margin_GameNightBefore
race
NHL_Margin_GameNightBefore
precipitation
year of sentence
crime
crimetype
education of offender
counts of conviction
min temperature
state
month of sentence
probation office
max temperature
date
district
Original Variables
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
scaled importance
Appendix Figure L.8: Normalized node purity importance for the original dataset without residualizing. We color code
“unrelated” variables such as sports and weather features in red and the remaining variables in blue.
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